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Title word cross-reference

α [CR17]. ϵ [Elb21]. \exists [GMVY18]. $\exists R$ [BM21]. λ [GPZ21].

-complete [BM21]. **-Envy-Free** [Elb21].
-regular [GPZ21]. **-Strongly** [CR17].

1 [CH21a, HCGM22]. **1/e** [ST20].

2 [CH21b].

Acceptance [Mau21]. **ACM** [CM13, CM17, GÜ23]. **Ad** [CV15, NW18]. **Additive** [GJLZ20]. **Adversarial** [EKM18]. **Advertising** [CMV15, GMMV15, GMS15, NW18]. **Affine** [NS15]. **After** [CCS17]. **Agenda** [ABC⁺15]. **Agents** [CCK⁺16, DSE15, GK16, KR20, MXX22, SY22, YOA⁺13]. **Aggregation** [KKL19]. **Algorithm** [GHV23]. **Algorithmic** [AER⁺24, FN13]. **Algorithms** [BK20, SSCD14]. **Allocation** [AV20, CISZ21, CEK16, DSSX21, EKM18, GHLTC23, GHBBM22, NW18]. **Allocations** [BCIZ21, KPS18]. **Alternating** [CEK16]. **Altruism** [CDKS14, HS13]. **Amazon** [BYBYST13]. **among** [MXX22]. **Analysis** [KFH15, SSO23, JP13]. **Anarchy** [AER⁺24, AV23, BGR14, CDKS14, CDD⁺14, CKST16, KS23, MBP22, PNS16, Rou15]. **Anonymity** [RS16]. **Answering** [SY22]. **Ante** [Mau21]. **Antifolk** [PRU17]. **Applications** [CR17, RW18]. **Approach** [EG16]. **Approval** [SZ20]. **Approximate**

[CFG15, FS16, GR16, PT13].
Approximately [CBGdK⁺20].
Approximating [AKS17]. **Approximation** [AZ21, BK20]. **Arbitrage** [CMV15].
Arrival [DSS⁺24]. **Arrivals** [DSS⁺24].
Arrow [DGV16]. **Assignment** [BCH⁺20, DSS⁺24, FB17, FSZ18].
Assortment [ILM⁺21]. **Atomic** [HS13, PCFM21]. **Auction** [AKLV17, GHV23]. **Auctioning** [ADH15].
Auctions [AV23, AMS14, Ass20, ADH15, BL16, CDE⁺14, CMV15, CKST16, CR17, CBLHS15, CBGdK⁺20, DFI14, DHS15, DHW15, DHS18, HIMM13, HK15, KP13, Ma22, RGKK16]. **Augmentations** [ISW23].
Automated [OPRS13]. **Averse** [DSE15].
Axiomatic [FSST19].

Back [CM17]. **Bad** [EPR19]. **Badge** [EG16]. **Balancing** [VBMM22]. **Based** [BB17, DFJ⁺15, DHS18, GMS15, JZ23, BCH⁺20, GHBBM22, GH24]. **Bayesian** [CR17, GK17]. **Be** [CKV20, EPR19].
Behavior [FP16]. **Behavioral** [EPR19].
Best [CDE⁺14, DS22, GMC21].
Best-Response [CDE⁺14, GMC21].
Better [HR20]. **Beyond** [PPS15]. **Bid** [HN19]. **Bid-Limited** [HN19]. **Bidders** [DHK⁺16, HK15]. **Bidding** [KMM24, SG20].
Bimatrix [FS16]. **Binary** [ABC⁺15, LSA24, YOA⁺13]. **Bitcoin** [LSZ22]. **Black** [GLT20]. **Black-Box** [GLT20]. **Blockchain** [GH24].
Blockchain-based [GH24]. **Boolean** [GNR18]. **Border** [GNR18]. **Borders** [GNR18]. **Bound** [MBP22]. **Boundary** [JLSW17]. **Bounded** [BGP15].
Bounded-Distance [BGP15]. **Bounds** [CKST16, GR16, KS23]. **Box** [GLT20].
Bribing [KKM20]. **Broadcast** [CNP⁺21].
Budget [CGMW21, DDW18, DHS15, GJLZ20, JT21].
Budget-Constrained [CGMW21].
Budget-Feasible [GJLZ20]. **Budgeting** [GKSA19]. **Budgets** [CBLHS15]. **Buy-in** [SSO23]. **Buyer** [AV23, CGMW21, RW18]. **Buyers** [Ma22].

Call [WS15]. **Can** [CKV20, EPR19].
Candidate [AZ21]. **Capacity** [FG16].
Cardinal [GH18]. **Case** [ABM20, BGR14, GH24]. **Catastrophe** [LSCP23]. **Causal** [IO18]. **Characteristic** [MSR⁺14]. **Characterization** [FSST19].
Characterizing [KLM21]. **Checking** [HH13]. **Chief** [GÜ23, PS17]. **Choice** [AZ21]. **Choices** [BFK17]. **Chores** [GHLTC23]. **Classifiers** [DFJ⁺15, KR20].
Closing [ST20]. **Cloud** [KLM21, KKS19, SG20]. **Clustering** [KS23].
Co [GÜ23, PS17]. **Co-Editors-in-Chief** [GÜ23, PS17]. **Coalition** [BBW23].
Coalitions [FG16]. **Collective** [ABC⁺15].
Combinatorial [Ass20, BMS22, BL16, CEK16, CBGdK⁺20, DHS18, ILM⁺21].
Committee [CJMW20, FSST19]. **Common** [CCS17]. **Communication** [GSP21].
Communities [ZPvdS14]. **Comparative** [HV16]. **Competition** [PST14].
Competitive [HPS⁺18, KP13, Sar13].
complete [BM21]. **Completeness** [GMVY18]. **Complexity** [AM14, BB15, CR22, GSP21, GLT20, GPS13, GR16, OPR16, SSCD14].
Compressions [DHS18]. **Computable** [DS22]. **Computation** [BBH⁺17, CFGS15, GSP21, H MV16, MSR⁺14, CM13, GÜ23].
Computational [HP19]. **Computing** [BB17, GMC21, JLSW17, KT23, SSO23].
Concepts [BB17, JZ23]. **Congestion** [BGR14, BV19, CFGS15, CG16, GKK20, HS13, KR15, PCFM21, HM24]. **Connected** [AD15]. **Connection** [ACV13]. **Consensus** [HH13, MT13]. **Constrain** [FG16].
Constrained [CGMW21]. **Constraints** [DDW18, FG16, FSZ18]. **Contagious** [BEK⁺13]. **Contest** [GK16]. **Contests** [GH18, LSA24]. **Continuous** [HLPV18].

Convergence [AKLV17, CDE⁺14]. **Convex** [ACV13, DGV16, GMC21]. **Convexity** [KMM24]. **Cookie** [GMMV15]. **Copies** [GHLTC23]. **Correlated** [ABF⁺17, BB15, MS15]. **Correlations** [ISW23]. **Cost** [BMS22, GKK20, RS16, SSO23]. **Cost-Sharing** [GKK20, RS16]. **Costs** [KC21]. **Covering** [BKPS14, MS15]. **Creation** [AEED⁺14, BGP15]. **Cross** [HH13]. **Crowdsourcing** [SZ20]. **cryptographic** [GLR13]. **Current** [CEK16].

Data [GILR20, WYZ18]. **Debreu** [DGV16]. **Decentralized** [GH24]. **Decision** [BM21, CKRS14, FP16, GMVY18]. **Decisions** [ABC⁺15]. **Deconstructing** [BYBYST13]. **Deferred** [Mau21]. **Delay** [SG20]. **Delivery** [CV15]. **Demand** [LGMC22]. **Demands** [GHV23]. **Democracy** [GKMP21]. **Design** [BFT16, BL16, EG16, FZ15, GLT20, GK16, HH13, HVM16, KNP13, KC21, LSCP23, MS15, PT13, RTC16, XV15]. **Designing** [KS19]. **Destabilize** [LSCP23]. **Deterministic** [CGS24, FT14, Ma22]. **Dichotomous** [ABM20]. **Differentiated** [SG20]. **Digital** [AMS14]. **Discounted** [DS22]. **Discriminant** [DFJ⁺15]. **Discriminant-Based** [DFJ⁺15]. **Discrimination** [KM24]. **Display** [CMV15, GMS15]. **Distance** [BGP15]. **Distortion** [EKPS24]. **Distributed** [ADH19, ASA17, FTW20, JLSW17]. **Distribution** [JZ23]. **Distribution-Based** [JZ23]. **Distributions** [BBDS17, CR17, DSS⁺24, GPZ21]. **Diversity** [BCH⁺20]. **Divisible** [ADH15]. **Division** [AD15, BK20, LV21, MBP22, Vel18]. **Do** [Ass20, CPS16, FG16, KR20]. **Does** [HM16]. **Domains** [BMS22, FZ15, NS15, NPJ13]. **Dominance** [BB17, HKV16]. **Dominance-Based** [BB17]. **Dominant** [PPS15, NPJ13]. **dominant-strategy** [NPJ13]. **Double** [AKLV17]. **Dynamic** [AV20, BDKS15, BV19, KT23, RSUW20]. **Dynamics** [AFM⁺19, COP13, CDE⁺14, CNP⁺21, JLSW17, YOA⁺13].

Each [KKL19]. **Earning** [BGHM19]. **EC'12** [LBI15]. **EC'14** [CE16]. **EC'15** [FLS18]. **EC'16** [CB19]. **EC'17** [Ano20]. **EC'19** [FM20]. **EC2** [BYBYST13]. **Economic** [EG16]. **Economics** [CM13, GMMV15, GÜ23]. **Edge** [SSK22]. **Editing** [CM17]. **Editorial** [CM17, GÜ23, PS17]. **Editors** [PS17, GÜ23]. **Effective** [CKV20]. **Effectiveness** [GMS15]. **Efficiency** [AD15, GKK20, MBP22]. **Efficient** [ACV13, BCIZ21, CFGS15, CBGdK⁺20, JT21]. **Effort** [KR20]. **Election** [ADH19]. **Electric** [CEK16]. **Elicitation** [KS19]. **Eliciting** [CKRS14]. **Envy** [AKS17, CISZ21, Elb21]. **Envy-Free** [AKS17]. **Envy-freeness** [CISZ21]. **Equilibration** [MBP22]. **Equilibria** [AEED⁺14, BM21, BBH⁺17, COP18, CFGS15, DS22, FS16, GKK20, GMVY18, GR16, GMC21, KYY20, KR15, HM24]. **Equilibrium** [BB15, GHV23, GPS13, HP19, HP21, KFH15, OPR16, RS14]. **Equitable** [Vel18]. **Equivalence** [Mau21]. **ESP** [JP13]. **Estimates** [HH13]. **Evolving** [AFM⁺19]. **Ex** [DDW18, Mau21, RS14]. **Ex-Ante** [Mau21]. **Ex-Post** [DDW18, RS14]. **Examples** [BGR14]. **Exchange** [KMRR18, XV15]. **Exclusive** [KNP13]. **Existence** [CFGS15, GKK20]. **Exploitation** [GS15]. **Exponential** [KKM20]. **Exposing** [BKPS14]. **Expressive** [DHW15]. **Extensions** [PPS15]. **Externalities** [HIMM13]. **Extraction** [HH13].

Facility [AZ21, FT14]. **Fair** [AD15, ABM20, BK20, BCIZ21, GHLTC23, LV21]. **Fairness** [CKM⁺19, CSHS24, CJMW20, EKPS24,

MXX22, OPR16, PPS15]. **Farewell** [CM17]. **Fast** [AKLV17]. **Feasible** [GJLZ20, JT21]. **Fee** [LSZ22]. **Few** [AKL19]. **Finding** [BCIZ21, FS16]. **Fine** [BH22]. **Fine-grained** [BH22]. **Finite** [BBH⁺17]. **First** [CKST16]. **First-Price** [CKST16]. **Fisher** [BGHM19]. **Fit** [SSCD14]. **Fixed** [GSP21, Ma22]. **Fixed-Price** [Ma22]. **Flooded** [FZ15]. **Fluid** [GKMP21]. **Formation** [BEK⁺13]. **Fractional** [ABB⁺19]. **Framework** [JZ23, KT23, KS19]. **Free** [AKS17, Elb21, KNP13]. **freeness** [CISZ21]. **Function** [MSR⁺14]. **Functions** [GNR18]. **Fundamental** [WYZ18]. **Future** [CM17].

Game [ADH19, AEED⁺14, EG16, FN13, GMC21, HKMN16, IO18, JLSW17, JZ23, JP13]. **Game-Theoretic** [ADH19, IO18, JZ23, GMC21, JP13]. **Games** [ABB⁺19, BKPS14, BGR14, BGP15, BV19, BM21, BBH⁺17, COP13, CFGS15, CNP⁺21, CSV20, CG16, DS22, FS16, FTW20, FT14, GKK20, HP19, HP21, HS13, KYY20, KS23, KR15, LSCP23, MSR⁺14, MBP22, PCFM21, PRU17, Rou15, SSK22, HM24]. **Gamification** [EG16]. **Gap** [ST20]. **Generalized** [FB17, GKK20, MSR⁺14]. **Geometric** [FW17]. **Geometry** [COP13]. **Given** [AZ21]. **Global** [BKPS14]. **Going** [BMM18]. **Good** [EPR19]. **Goodness** [SSCD14]. **Goodness-of-Fit** [SSCD14]. **Goods** [AMS14, ADH15, BHSZ15, FSZ18, GHLTC23]. **Grading** [CKV20]. **grained** [BH22]. **Graphical** [COP18]. **Graphs** [Elb21, ST20]. **Greedy** [BL16]. **Grid** [CEK16]. **Gross** [GHV23]. **Group** [CJMW20]. **Groups** [AFM⁺19].

Half [HR20]. **Having** [DS22]. **Hedonic** [ABB⁺19]. **Hereditary** [LV21]. **Heterogeneous** [AMPS20, ADH15, DHS15, SY22].

Hierarchy [FSST19]. **Homotopy** [GPS13]. **Housing** [GHBBM22]. **Howson** [GPS13].

Impact [CDKS14, HM24]. **Impartial** [BFK17, CGS24]. **Imperfect** [HP21, XV15]. **Implementation** [MSR⁺14]. **Improved** [HM16]. **Improving** [GMS15]. **Incentive** [WYZ18]. **Incentives** [EG16, IM15, SZ20]. **Incomplete** [Rou15]. **Inconsistent** [AK21]. **Increase** [HM16]. **Individually** [BBW23]. **Indivisibilities** [PPS15]. **Indivisible** [CISZ21, CSHS24]. **Induce** [KR20]. **Inefficiency** [HM24]. **Inefficient** [LSCP23]. **Inequalities** [ISW23]. **Inference** [IO18]. **Influence** [ST20]. **Information** [BKPS14, GPTD22, KS19, Rou15]. **Instance** [BYBYST13]. **Integrating** [HLPV18]. **Intensity** [KLM21]. **Interaction** [Ass20]. **Interdependent** [RTC16]. **Internship** [BAHR18]. **Introduction** [Ano20, CI15, CB19, CH21a, CH21b, CE16, FN13, FLS18, FM20, HCGM22, LBI15, MT16, CM13]. **Invest** [KR20]. **Israeli** [BAHR18]. **Issue** [Ano20, CI15, CB19, CH21a, CH21b, CE16, FN13, FLS18, FM20, HCGM22, KKL19, LBI15]. **Item** [CISZ21]. **Items** [CSHS24, DHS15, Ma22].

Justified [EFI⁺24].

Keyword [CBLHS15]. **Knapsack** [GKSA19]. **Known** [DSS⁺24].

Large [AKS17, IM15, PRU17]. **Leader** [ADH19]. **Learning** [ACV13, BMM18, FP16, GMC21, JZ23, LGMC22]. **Lemke** [GPS13]. **Leximin** [KPS18]. **Limit** [HLPV18]. **Limitations** [BL16, CPV20, PPS15]. **Limited** [BDKS15, HN19]. **Limits** [BGHM19, DHS15, WYZ18]. **Line** [Elb21]. **Linear** [DGV16, GILR20, ISW23]. **Liquid** [GKMP21]. **Liquidity** [OPRS13]. **Liquidity-Sensitive** [OPRS13]. **Lists**

[HPS⁺18]. **Load** [VBMM22]. **Local** [HMV16]. **Location** [AZ21, FT14]. **Locked** [LSCP23]. **Locked-in** [LSCP23]. **Long** [MBP22]. **Looking** [CM17]. **Lower** [BH22].

Maker [OPRS13]. **Makers** [HLPV18]. **Making** [ACV13, CKRS14, MT13]. **Many** [BH22]. **Many-to-one** [BH22]. **Market** [ACV13, GHV23, HLPV18, LSZ22, OPRS13]. **Markets** [AKS17, BGHM19, CPV20, DGV16, EFRS20, HLPV18, IM15, IO18, KNP13, MXX22, Mau21, Sar13]. **Marriage** [CJ21]. **Match** [BAHR18, GMMV15]. **Matching** [AER⁺24, AV20, AZ21, AKL19, ASA17, BH22, DSSX21, DSS⁺24, FIT⁺15, GMMV15, KYY20, MXX22, Mau21]. **Matchings** [CSS21, CR22]. **Matroid** [BCIZ21]. **Matters** [CNP⁺21]. **Maximin** [BK20]. **Maximization** [BHSZ15, DDW18, DHK⁺16, EFG⁺14, GPTD22, MXX22, RSUW20, ST20]. **Maximizers** [NS15]. **Maximizing** [Elb21]. **Maximum** [ASA17, CKM⁺19]. **Measures** [SSCD14]. **Mechanics** [GKMP21]. **Mechanism** [BFT16, BL16, CGMW21, DHW15, FB17, FZ15, GLT20, GK17, HH13, H MV16, KNP13, KC21, LSCP23, MS15, PT13, RTC16]. **Mechanisms** [ABF⁺17, CEK16, CCK⁺16, DSE15, FT14, GJLZ20, GHBBM22, JT21, KM24, KS19, RS14, RW18, SY22, WYZ18, WS15, NPJ13]. **Mediated** [Sar13]. **Mediators** [BFT16]. **Medical** [BAHR18]. **Method** [GPS13]. **MHR** [GPZ21]. **Microfinance** [IO18]. **Minimal** [FW17, GPTD22]. **Minimizing** [RW19]. **Minimum** [ASA17, FIT⁺15]. **Mining** [GH24]. **Mixed** [ASA17]. **Mixing** [ABM20, EKM18]. **Model** [IO18]. **Models** [EKM18]. **Modest** [Ass20]. **Monetary** [HKV16]. **Money** [PT13]. **Monitoring** [XV15]. **Monotone** [JT21]. **Monotonicity** [RW18]. **Multi** [BM21, EFRS20, GMVY18]. **Multi-Player** [GMVY18, BM21].

Multi-Unit [EFRS20]. **Multidimensional** [RSUW20]. **Multimarket** [HV16]. **Multiplayer** [IO18]. **Multiple** [CBLHS15, KKL19, Ma22, RW19]. **Multiunit** [AV23]. **Myopic** [CDE⁺14].

Nash [AEED⁺14, BM21, CFGS15, CKM⁺19, FS16, GMVY18, HM24, VBMM22]. **Near** [BKPS14, COP13, MS15, NW18]. **Near-Optimal** [MS15]. **Near-Optimality** [BKPS14]. **Near-Optimum** [NW18]. **Near-Potential** [COP13]. **Need** [Ass20]. **Neighbourhood** [GHBBM22]. **Neighbourhood-based** [GHBBM22]. **Network** [AEED⁺14, BGP15, BEK⁺13, HIMM13, RS16, HM24]. **Networked** [IO18]. **Networks** [KS23]. **No** [DS22]. **Noisy** [CPS16]. **Nonequilibrium** [FP16]. **Nonexcludable** [BHSZ15]. **Notions** [CSHS24]. **Nucleolus** [KT23].

Observations [KNP13]. **Offline** [DSSX21, MXX22]. **One** [SY22, BH22]. **Online** [ACV13, CNP⁺21, DHK⁺16, DSSX21, DSS⁺24, GMMV15, KP13, MXX22, NW18, VBMM22, ZPvdS14]. **Online-Matching** [MXX22]. **Opaque** [BMM18]. **Opinion** [YOA⁺13]. **Opponent** [GS15]. **Optimal** [GK16, GPZ21, GJLZ20, HIMM13, KMRR18, KM24, Ma22, MS15, NPJ13, PCFM21, RTC16, XV15]. **Optimality** [BKPS14]. **Optimization** [ACV13, DHK⁺16, ILM⁺21]. **Optimize** [CV15]. **Optimized** [EKPS24]. **Optimum** [NW18]. **Oral** [AKLV17]. **Orders** [HLPV18]. **Ordinal** [AZ21, CKV20, Ma22]. **Our** [CM17].

Packet [HPS⁺18]. **Page** [DHK⁺16]. **Pairwise** [CJ21]. **Paradox** [HV16]. **parameter** [NPJ13]. **Pareto** [KMRR18]. **Part** [CH21a, CH21b, HCGM22]. **Participatory** [GKSA19]. **Partitions**

[GMC21]. **Partners** [AER⁺24]. **Payment** [DFJ⁺15]. **payments** [NPJ13]. **Payoff** [FS16]. **Payoffs** [EPR19]. **Peer** [AMPS20, CKV20, FW17]. **Penalties** [AK21]. **Perfect** [DS22, KYY20]. **Performance** [KR18]. **Perspective** [ADH19, FW17]. **Pieces** [AD15]. **Planning** [AK21]. **Platforms** [DSSX21, XV15]. **Player** [GMVY18, BM21]. **Players** [MS15]. **Point** [GSP21]. **Polynomial** [BV19, CG16]. **Pools** [GH24]. **Population** [LSCP23]. **Position** [CDE⁺14]. **Positions** [AZ21, KKL19]. **Positive** [HIMM13]. **Possibilities** [CPV20]. **Post** [DDW18, RS14]. **Posted** [ABF⁺17]. **Posted-Price** [ABF⁺17]. **Posting** [BBDS17]. **Potential** [COP13]. **Power** [BFK17, CEK16, FT14, FZ15]. **Practical** [OPRS13]. **Predicted** [EPR19]. **Prediction** [AMPS20, CPV20, DSE15, FW17, HLPV18]. **Predictions** [CKRS14]. **Preference** [SSCD14]. **Preferences** [ABM20, BMM18, CCS17, CSS21, CR22, CJ21, Ma22]. **Presence** [BEK⁺13]. **Price** [AER⁺24, ABF⁺17, AV23, BBM13, BCH⁺20, BGR14, CDKS14, CDD⁺14, CG16, CKST16, EFI⁺24, KS23, KM24, Ma22, MBP22, PNS16, Rou15]. **Prices** [BBDS17]. **Pricing** [AKS17, BDKS15, BYBYST13, COP18, Elb21, EFRS20, GPZ21, KKS19, RSUW20, SG20]. **Principle** [KC21]. **Prior** [KNP13]. **Prior-Free** [KNP13]. **Priorities** [BMM18, SSK22]. **Priority** [HPS⁺18]. **Priors** [GLT20]. **Privacy** [CCK⁺16, CSV20, DFI14, WYZ18]. **Private** [CPV20, KMRR18]. **Pro** [EPR19]. **Pro-sociality** [EPR19]. **Problem** [AKL19, CJ21, FB17, FP16, FSZ18]. **Problems** [AZ21, BCH⁺20, BM21, BH22, DSSX21, KMM24, MS15]. **Procedures** [Mau21]. **Profit** [Elb21, HH13]. **Profit-Maximizing** [Elb21]. **Program** [DGV16]. **Programming** [KT23]. **Projects** [GNR18]. **Prophet** [ISW23]. **Proportional** [EKPS24]. **Protocols** [ADH19, ZPvdS14, GLR13]. **Provision** [CCS17]. **Provision-After-Wait** [CCS17]. **Public** [GNR18, GHBBM22, KLM21]. **Pure** [CFG15, KR15, HM24]. **Put** [ABC⁺15]. **QPTAS** [Elb21]. **Quantitative** [HV16]. **Queries** [AKL19, FS16, GMC21, LGMC22]. **Query** [AM14, BB15, GR16]. **Question** [SY22]. **Quota** [BCH⁺20]. **Quota-based** [BCH⁺20]. **Quotas** [BH22, FIT⁺15, GHBBM22]. **R** [GMVY18]. **R-Completeness** [GMVY18]. **Random** [AMS14, FSZ18, IM15, Mau21]. **Randomized** [KM24]. **Rank** [BCIZ21]. **Ranking** [RGKK16]. **Rating** [ZPvdS14]. **Ratio** [KP13]. **Rational** [DGV16]. **rationality** [GLR13]. **Reaching** [BBW23]. **Real** [KMM24, KPS18]. **Real-time** [KMM24]. **Recall** [HP21]. **Recaps** [FP16]. **Recency** [FP16]. **Recommendations** [CKRS14]. **Recommender** [DFI14]. **Reconstructing** [BMM18]. **Records** [FP16]. **Redesigning** [BAHR18, LSZ22]. **Regression** [GILR20]. **Regret** [MBP22, RW19]. **Regular** [CR17, GPZ21]. **Related** [KMM24]. **Rent** [Vel18]. **Repeated** [DS22, PRU17]. **Representation** [EFI⁺24]. **Reserves** [RW19]. **Resource** [PPS15]. **Resources** [DSSX21]. **Response** [CDE⁺14, DS22, GMC21]. **Restoring** [KR15]. **Restricted** [CR22]. **Results** [SSCD14]. **Reusable** [DSSX21]. **Reveal** [CPS16]. **Revealed** [SSCD14]. **Revelation** [KC21]. **Revenue** [AKS17, BHSZ15, DDW18, EFG⁺14, GPTD22, HM16, Ma22, RW18]. **Revenue-Optimal** [Ma22]. **Revisited** [CSHS24]. **Reward** [GH24, KS19]. **Ride** [DSSX21]. **Ride-sharing** [DSSX21]. **Ring** [CDD⁺14]. **Risk** [BEK⁺13, DSE15, PNS16]. **Risk-Averse** [DSE15]. **Robust**

[GPTD22, HV16, MS15, RTC16]. **Romantic** [AER⁺24]. **Routing** [CDD⁺14, HPS⁺18, MBP22, SSK22]. **Rules** [AM14, DFJ⁺15, FSST19, LWC22].

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